Abstract

Dances are frequently re-embodied, both with and without permission from the creator. In particular, the widespread circulation of dance online has resulted in the reuse and recontextualization of dances. It has been well-noted that the copying of dance rarely results in legal cases (e.g. Van Camp 2019: 90, Whatley et al 2015: 70). Despite the possible uses of copyright as a tool for artists to gain greater economic exploitation (Pavis, Waelde and Whatley 2017), it is not commonly drawn on by dance artists in the UK. There are many possible reasons for this, including the expense of legal cases (Van Camp 2019: 10). However, alongside the wider arts and creative industries, dance artists are now facing the challenges posed by AI and the question of how to protect and benefit from their work from the possible use of their work as training data by AI models. There is important work being done to develop IP regulation for the creative industries (e.g. Pavis 2021, 2020, Gov.UK 2024). However, unless we fully understand the reasons why copyright is not used widely within the dance sector, it is unlikely that dance artists will benefit fully from new legislation. In response to this situation, this paper proposes that a better understanding of dance ontology can help reveal the misalignment of dance practices and copyright law. I draw on discourses in analytic philosophical aesthetics (Van Camp 2019, 2006, Conroy 2013, Pakes 2020, Gover 2021) and data gathered during Moving Online: Ontology and Ownership of Online Dance,1 to demonstrate how the way that dance artists describe the nature and ownership of their works differs to the conceptualisation of dance works in copyright law. I go on to discuss how the embodied nature of dance complicates distinctions between copying, adaptation and influence, and unpack how we might interpret these categories in relation to the behaviours of AI within current copyright legislation.

How to Cite:

Blades, H., (2026) “Dance Copies: Identity, Law and the Challenges of Artificial Intelligence”, Law Text Culture 29(1), 156–172. doi: https://doi.org/10.14453/ltc.1858